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1. Abstract 
On the basis of an hazard evaluation applied to underground constructions in urbanized 
areas, a number of problems due to the special operating contest are put in evidence, a not 
negligible difference from the tunneling operations in mountain areas, commonly rather 
poorly dwelled. 
As discussed, asides from the law enforced need of a careful safety analysis from the very 
first steps of the feasibility evaluation of the project, some typical aspects of operations in 
urbanized areas cannot be rigidly planned, due to a number of reasons, which can roughly be 
ascribed to the following topics: 
a. the narrowness of the construction site facilities, maneuvering and storage areas, and the 
possible interference with the common citizen activities (mainly, but certainly not only, in 
terms of movement and transportation), which can evolve during the construction time 
where important projects are considered; 
b. the often large number of contractors, each of them developing its assigned site, which, in 
the case of a subway, corresponds to a defined stretch of the entire line: the sites are then 
contiguous, this implying a careful coordination all along  the construction duration.  
The risk analysis approach identified as suitable for an effective risk analysis for these 
situations is summarized, and the basic risk management criteria and technical solutions are 
discussed, as applied to a subway under construction in Northern Italy.  
 
 
2. Foreword 
 
In Italy, the adoption of European Community Directive 92/57/EEC of 24 June 1992 on 
the implementation of minimum safety and health requirements at temporary or mobile 
construction sites (eight individual directives referring to article 16(1) of EEC Directive 
89/391) has become complete with the issuing of Legislative Decree 494/96, Updated as 
Decree 528 of 19 December 1999.  
In accordance with the principia stated in the EC directive, the Italian enforcement 
defines the need of a careful risk analysis aimed to prevent injuries and professional diseases 
of the workers, and the roles of both the planning stage safety coordinator and the safety 
coordinator during work execution stages. 
Substantially, in coherence with the analysis proposed in the official EC bulletin in 1993 
as a support to the issuing of the 92/57 Directive, where the main causes of fatal injuries are 
summarized as shown in the following chart, the importance of a careful risk analysis, to be 
carried out at the very first stage of the project feasibility evaluation, and of systematic audits 
 
of the interference risk along the whole work development are strongly recommended, and 
specially qualified people are charged of these tasks. 
Finally, further dispositions on the matter of safety are contained in the 109/94 Law - 
commonly named “Merloni Ter”- Art.31, stating that in case of construction commissioned 
by public administrations, in the pre-consignment of the work stage, the company is requested 
to supply its Operative Safety Plan (“Complementary and Detailed Plan”) to be then inserted 
into the Safety Plan already developed by the Safety Coordinator during the design stage. 
 
Fig. 1 -CAUSES OF FATALITIES AT CONSTRUCTION SITES - CE RESEARCH WORK PUBLISHED IN THE CE BULL. IN 1993 
(the figures put in evidence the importance of a careful design and management of the safety aspects) 
C   37%
A   35% B   28%
 
A. deficiency at the design phase (inadequate evaluation of the 
parameters conditioning the static conditions, incorrect machinery 
and equipment selection); 
B. lack in the work planning (this also at the general design stage, or 
where schedule variations are required during the work) giving 
rise to interference between different operations in time and space;
careless work management by the contractor (disregarding of the rules contained in the Safety Plan -
resulting from the risk analysis carried out by the Planning Stage Safety Coordinator- or imposed by the 
Safety Coordinator during work execution stages, poor equipment maintenance, inadequate information of 
workers on the risks and safe procedures, etc.). 
C. 
 
 
3. An effective approach to the risk analysis and management 
 
To get a correct evaluation and management of the risks for the safety and health of 
workers, the following considerations should be taken into account: 
 
risk = probable damage deriving from the event (M) * probability of the event occurring (F) 
WHERE A TIME REFERENCE IS ADOPTED (e.g. 1 year) THE RISK SHOULD BE EXPRESSED AS A NUMBER, THIS ONLY 
MAKING POSSIBLE AN EFFECTIVE RISKS COMPARISON AND A CORRECT APPROACH TO THE RISK MANAGEMENT, ON 
THE BASIS OF THE CRITICALITY 
a. probable damage M = the product of two factors, the first quantifying the worst expectable 
consequence of the concurrent presence of people and hazardous entities (substances, situations, etc. 
with the intrinsic property or quality of causing damage): death, injury, etc., which can be referred to 
conventional lost days, a common practice in the statistical accident analysis; the second the possibility 
of interference (contact factor with the hazard), as a function of the exposure duration to potentially 
hazardous situations or operations (commonly expressed as a percentage of the work cycle). 
b. probability of occurrence  F = probability (number of expectable events on a pre stated time span) that 
the setting off event should occur (statistical data on the occurrence of professional injury or illness in 
similar operating conditions could prove valuable) 
in order to reduce the risk (once the impossibility of removing it has been ascertained) M and F should 
be reduced: 
 acting on the probable damage M means, on one hand, adopting a solution that minimizes the 
consequences of the event (e.g. safety belts, PPD, etc.), on the other minimizing the duration of the 
critical operations through organization improvements, the use of remote control devices, etc.; 
 acting on the frequency of occurrence means increasing the reliability of the system (for example 
through the maintenance of equipment, the identification of correct procedures etc. ) 
 
Since the statistical data on professional injuries and illnesses presently available in Italy 
cannot be considered sufficiently detailed, and the non observance of the law statements is not 
listed as a determining factor of the accident occurrence, the direct use of the described 
approach is often quite difficult.  
To overcame this problem, it can be considered the purpose for which the provision of 
the law and the technical regulations on work safety and health were introduced, that is the 
protection of the workers: the obvious conclusion can then be reached that a situation 
 
complying with the law statements, and in accordance to the development of the technical 
progress will entail the conditions of minimum probability of occurrence of hazardous events 
that is today achievable. 
The aforesaid sentences summarize the basics upon which a well tested approach was 
developed /1,2,3/, based on the relative probability of the occurrence of the event PR, in the 
form: 
 granted  constantly is regulatins technicaldate  to up andlaw  of respectthe  where ,occurrence ofy probabilit  minimum
 eventthe  of occurrencethe  ofy probabilit actualPR  
The uncertainty in the numerical quantification of the risk is so avoided where, 
ascertained the impossibility of removing it by means of alternative solutions, the relative 
probability is  1. 
The discussed approach makes possible the following results: 
an unbiased numerical risk evaluation, and the resulting correct approach to the risk 
management on the basis of a grounded hierarchy of interventions; 
the minimum risk operating techniques and technologies shall be identified at the very first step 
of the general design, and no procedures involving higher risk conditions adopted on the basis 
of the obsolete approach of tradition thinking and cost analysis (as discussed in /4/, where the 
TBM machines are considered);  
a correct evaluation of the possible entity of the consequences of the damaging events, since an 
unexpected worsening of the consequences of an event due to other lacking (e.g. of assistance 
or emergency interventions means, etc.) cannot occur for situations that are surely according to 
the up to date regulations; 
the continuous updating of the risk analysis (and of the safety conditions) in accordance with 
the construction developments and the technology improvements being intrinsic in the discussed 
approach, the same proves coherent with the Total Quality Management systems of growing 
interest also in the construction activities. Moreover, a typical situation where excavation 
operations are carried on, the original unavoidable uncertainty in the rock parameters used in 
the preliminary  static evaluations can be overcome by the use of back analysis techniques. 
The listed results are nevertheless void of practical significance where the all the possible 
hazards are not taken into account: as it is common knowledge, the hazard evaluation phase is 
quite critical in the process of risk analysis, assessment and management. At the purpose, in 
the case of the considered subway construction, a careful checklist was specially set up, where 
necessary with the What if - checklist approach: in the following table an example of the 
achieved result is provided (tab. 1). 
 
HAZARD CONSEQUENCE TECHNICAL MEASURES REQUIRED BY THE LAW  
AND UP TO DATE TECHNICAL STANDARDS 
fire in 
underground 
suffocation, burns 





substantial reduction of the flammable material presence and of 
ignition causes (fittings and equipment selection and maintenance); 
specially designed ventilation systems; 
fire detection and management, and alarm systems; 
escape-ways to the surface or to flame proof shelters provided with 
special fittings (survival kit, communication devices, etc.); 
special training of people, and availability of breathing and 
emergency apparatuses; 
special procedures for critical operations (e.g. welding, etc.). 
worst 
expectable 
consequence 
lost days contact 
factor 
[% shift] 
probable 
damage  
M =pd  fc 
relative 
probability  
PR 
RISK 
(1 worker) 
R =M  PR
n° workers 
involved 
[N] 
TOTAL 
RISK 
R  N 
suffocation, 
burns 60 90 5400 1 5400 5 27000 
 
 
4. Special concern due to the urbanized area operating contest  
 
Where underground constructions are carried on in heavily urbanized areas, which is 
typically the case of subways, a number of safety problems, involving workers, citizens or 
both rise up, due to the special operating contest (a typical situation is sketched in the 
following map, showing the basic layout of a subway under construction in Northern Italy).  
 
Fig. 2 example of the network of transportation systems in a Northern Italy town 
 
An hazard evaluation brings to evidence a number of aspects directly bound to the 
peculiarity of the surrounding areas, which increase the complexity and condition the times 
and costs of the operation /5/. 
These problems can roughly be ascribed to two main topics, often strictly connected, as 
exemplified in the following table: 
a. the narrowness of the construction site facilities, maneuvering and storage areas, and the possible 
interference with the common citizen life and activities, which moreover usually evolve along the 
construction time where important projects are considered. Some examples can be: 
 the public transportation system and some private vehicular traffic should be assured, even if 
somehow detoured: the surface operations are then forcedly divided into different steps, and 
require adjustments, this typically being the case of main avenues, where some traffic lines must 
remain in use; 
 the conditioning of productive and service activities (closing of shops and filling stations, 
modification of pedestrian and vehicle accesses to industrial factories); 
 the removal, from the public availability, of areas destined to social activities (squares, gardens, 
car parks, etc.) 
 the immediate proximity of the pollution sources (dust, noise, DPM, vibrations, ventilation 
systems exhaust, etc.) to the impactable areas; 
 the setting up of sites for equipment and waste materials, and of “villages” for the workers; 
 a number of buildings and artifacts of artistic or historical value are usually interested, this 
involving the introduction of more stringent than usual parameters, e.g. in terms of ground 
vibration levels, 
 special operations -such as shaft sinking and surface to underground access ways excavation- 
can prove particularly critical 
 even and particularly in difficult conditions the possible emergency situations at the construction 
site must be considered, together with the possible induced effects on the surrounding areas. 
 
 
b. the often large number of contractors -and subcontractors- each of them developing its assigned site, 
which in the case of a subway corresponds to a defined stretch of the entire line: the sites are then 
contiguous, this implying a careful coordination all along the construction duration, in spite of every 
careful work scheduling in the project design phase. Moreover, in many cases (as shown in the above 
proposed map) special link areas are necessary with different transportation systems, such as railway 
or bus stations, etc., they also under construction.  
As a matter of fact, a number of causes of unpredictable delay can occur, such as: 
 difficulties during the moving of underground service networks that are the responsibility of 
various management organizations (aqueducts, sewage, electric lines, telephonic and data 
transmission lines, gas and town heating pipes, etc.) of aerial networks, public transport lines 
(rails, stops, the study of alternative routes, substitution of trams with buses); 
 difficulties in the deviation and management of motor traffic modifications; 
 the discovery of illegal dumping areas and localized polluted situations; 
 the presence of archaeological sites and finds; 
 the discovery of explosive leftovers from world war II in spite of the clearing up campaigns. 
 
Asides from the aforesaid general considerations, it must be underlined that the 
experience in the safety design and management for such operations cannot be directly 
transferred from one site to the following, neither from a urban contest to a different one, nor 
even in the same town different districts, each situation requiring a special analysis and 
management, to accomplish as best as possible to the different local exigencies, taken into 
account that a no impact project is a Chimera, though: a typical example is the quite different 
attention devoted by the resident population to the environmental problems, somewhere 
focused on the protection of the public parks and gardens, or of the trees lining the avenues, 
somewhere else on the disturbance due to noise, dust and vibration, or to the careful 
preservation of sites of historic or archeological value. The same presence of a number of 
workers operating at the construction site can involve socioeconomic problems requiring 
special and different approach in different town contests. 
 
 
5. Some examples of the difficulties met in a real case, and of their management 
 
With reference to the mentioned real case, some practical problems of the risk 
management during each operative phase are here discussed, as examples of the paramount 
importance of:  
a. 
b. 
c. 
a careful and continuously updated work scheduling, as a means to avoid unexpected 
hazardous situations, 
the collective and individual safety provisions for the working crew, both of general use 
and specially selected for each operation where necessary, this involving that the critical 
parameters are systematically monitored; 
a progressive improvement of the info upon which base the impact assessment of the 
construction areas towards the surroundings. 
 
Example 1: construction site and surface traffic management 
The need of some conservation of the traffic -especially the public transportation- in the 
areas interested by the construction activity, asides of the already discussed limitation of the 
available areas for the construction operations, and the need of effective barrages at the site 
perimeter. G gives rise to a series of safety problems, among which the necessity of a careful 
management of the insertion into the traffic flow of the machinery and muck trucks -the 
layout and visibility shall be carefully considered, together with signal systems, special 
procedures and the selection of high visibility overalls- and of a splitting of the operations in 
trances to be fulfilled during low traffic periods (weekends and holidays); in general, this 
makes the work organization much more difficult, and the safety conditions of workers cannot 
 
be analyzed only for a secluded work site situation. A common misunderstanding is on the 
meaning of the site enclosure enforced by the D.Lgs.494: the goal is to impede any critical 
interference from the inside or the outside, this implying that a wire or light metal sheet shall 
be considered quite inadequate where heavy machinery is present at both sides of the 
enclosure (in spite of this obvious consideration, heavy lorries often run unconcernedly at 40 
mph at a red plastic cone distance from excavators and crews during highway maintenance 
operations). 
The example summarizes (see Tab.2) the various phases of the construction of a subway 
underground station in correspondence of the crossing of two main boulevards; in Table 3 the 
results of the Hazard Evaluation for such a situation are summarized:  
 
Tab. 2: Phases of the construction of a subway underground station in correspondence of the crossing of two main 
boulevards 
Phase 1: 
for the preservation of the tree lines, the following 
operations were necessary: 


deviation of the net of services (water, cable 
communications, sewers, etc.; 
set up of special detour ways for the public 
transportation (this being particularly complex in 
the case of tramways). 
The operations were carried out within working areas 
of very limited and irregular shape, in presence of 
traffic, and in brief time (to take advantage of periods 
of reduced traffic). 
Phase 2: 
the main lanes will be closed to traffic, which will be 
detoured into the narrower side lanes. In the central 
lanes will be installed the site, this implying heavy 
problems of insertion of every machine and worker into 
the traffic. 
Further problems are due to the necessity of leaving 
some crossing possibility to the traffic itself, this 
impeding the realization of a single site. 
in both phases the lack of space obliges to a detached positioning of the auxiliary facilities (for people and 
machinery), this implying further problems of interference with the traffic, and to the duplication of the essential 
facilities (such as energy and water lines) at each site. Even the security becomes exacting, due to the large 
number of entrances necessary to provide easy movements from every side of the areas 
 
 
Tab. 3: Results of the Hazard Evaluation for the construction of a subway underground station in correspondence of 
the crossing of two main boulevards 
X
X
X X
X
0416 Hotels and other shops
(*) Present buildings (detail)
PRESENT BUILDINGS LOCATION BUILDINGS
0415 Intercity railway station
0414 Hotels and other shops
Underground facilities identified : APS, AAM, ITA, WIN, ENE, AEM, ATC
Sewers movement:
1)APS_145 (waste water): trench with micropiles
2)APS_146 (waste water) trench with micropiles
3)APS_147 (sewage water) trench with micropiles
 - Presence of tram ways Interference with the public transportation Planned detourings
 - Presence of schools, hospital etc…(*) Collision and crashs, run overs Planned detouring, speed limits
Planned detourings
Info on the scheduled on the refueling 
Procedures on the refuleing operations
Procedures for emergency situations
Explosion,  toxic gas  irrushes - Presence of gases stations
 - Presence of newspapers, news and other 
stands and kiosk Collision and crashs, run overs Planned detouring, speed limits
 - Presence of dehors Collision and crashs, run overs Planned detouring, speed limits
 2 - Due to the contiguity or different essays  2 - Due to the contiguity or different essays  2 - Due to the contiguity or different essays
Irrushes of gas and water
Observation of the planned excavation
techniques
Definition of emergency procedures
Overseeing and monitoring of the excavation
areas
Monitoring of the environment pollution
Cleaning the tax leaving the construction area
Water spraying of the site routes
 - Presence of unmovable facilities X
 - Polluting of impacter immissions X Environment pollution
Overseeing of the excavation areas and
monitored presence of gas
Procedures for emergency situations
 - Presence of waste water X Poisoning and biological risk
Overseeing of the excavation areas
Definition of scavenging and reclamation
procedures
Overseeing of the excavation areas
Reclamation of industrial wastes
 - Presence or inrushes of gas X Poisoning and explosion
Poisoning  - Presence of toxic industrial wastes X
Overseeing of the excavation areas
Reclaimation of blombs
Procedures for emergency situations
 - Presence of facilities non previously identified Overseeing of the excavation areasDefinition of emergency procedures
 - Presence of bombs X Explosions
X Irrushes of gas and water
Set up of New Jersey and other enclosure
Planned detourings
Identified of the site to be visited and info of
the workers
Info of the visitors
The visitors should be accompaigned by
members of the staff
 - Presence of visitors X X Collision and crashs, run overs
 - Intrusion of derouted vehicles into the working 
area X X
Collision and crashes, run overs, falling down
into excavation areas
X Collision and crashs, run overs
X Interference with the construction machinery  - Traffic X
 - Presence of unauthorized people in the 
working areas X
Planned detourings
Set up of New Jersey and other enclosure
Overseeing of the construction site
Special organization on the way used by the
construction machinery into the traffic
Main countermaisures
 1 - General
 Station N.
Location
Main hazards due to the presence of the 
construction site Hazards for the site 
workers
Hazards from 
the 
construction 
site
Main consequences
 1 - General  1 - General
 
 
 
Example 2: the importance of a careful adjustment of the work schedule  
Even if, according to the UE directives, the operation schedule must be planned in the 
very design stage, where important construction operations are being carried on, it is of 
paramount importance that –where necessary- even substantial modifications are introduced. 
This can be due to the necessity of a better use of time and space, as previously discussed, or 
to unexpected time shifts in the development of workings in adjacent sited developed by 
different contractors or, finally, to recently acquired info or decisions modifying the input 
design data. 
The new work safety situation shall be carefully analyzed by the Safety Coordinator(s) 
during work execution, who will revise the Safety Plan, in cooperation with the main site 
contractor. 
Such a problem had to be faced during the excavation of a tunnel linking the underground 
of a station and a service shaft which will be used to set in operation a Tunnel Boring 
 
Machine; the station and the tunnel/shaft system are part of two different sites (developed by 
different contractors). 
The original safety plan stated linking tunnel to be excavated from the base of the shaft, 
to minimize the interference risk at the station site. This being impossible due to unexpected 
delays, a substantial revision of the general operations scheduling in the station was 
necessary, in order to take into account a new series of operations, what's more carried out by 
workers employed by a different contractor.  
The revision work, carried out by the Safety Coordinator (in the case the same for the two 
sites, this somehow simplifying the problem), was based upon a careful analysis of the 
original work program, upon which the new operations were imposed: two different kinds of 
interference in time and space were then identified, manageable by means of special technical 
provisions or requiring some time shift respectively. Thanks also to the use of a 3 D 
representation of the different working phases, a new time scheduling of the operations was 
formulated -and commonly agreed- as shown in Fig. 4, together with the most representative 
3 D drawings. 
 
Fig.3: the new time scheduling of the operations resulting from the revision of he original Safety Plan, in the new 
situation of excavation of the linking tunnel starting from the station instead of from the shaft 
 
 
  A  B 
 C 
 D 
 
 
 
Fig.4: 3 D representation of the different working phases 
(different gray levels point out different contractors) 
· A: phase of excavation of the main structure of the 
station 
· B:  set up of the bottom level of the station and 
start up of the tunnel excavation through the 
reinforced ground 
· C: final operations at the bottom level of the 
station and ongoing excavation of the tunnel 
· D: do + tunnel lining 
 
 
Example 3: improvement of the info upon which base the impact assessment of the 
construction areas towards the surroundings. 
Some forecasting of the noise emission from the station construction sites have been 
carried out, in order to get a preliminary evaluation of the expectable disturbance in the 
surrounding areas. The results got comparing the preexistent traffic noise to the output of 
computer simulations applied to the first phases of ground reinforcing (hydromills, earth 
moving machines and supporting facilities) show a moderate increase of the noise level at the 
facing buildings at ground level, and some reduction of the noise level reaching the top floors: 
this is due to the detouring of the heavy traffic previously interesting the avenue (see Fig 5)  
 
 
 
 
 
Fig.5 – Variation of the expectable sound level 
due to the first phases (preliminary ground 
reinforcing) of the construction operations in a 
station area at 1,5 m above the ground level 
 
It can be expected a worsening of the situation where massive excavations from the 
surface will take place, due to the increased number of heavy machines in limited areas. 
Where the further excavation phases will be started, some evaluations of the expectable noise 
level at the surrounding areas will be necessary, taken into account also the localized source 
represented by the station top opening (11.5 * 16.5 m2), e.g. according to the EN 12354-
4/2000 (Building Acoustics - Estimation of acoustic performance of buildings from the 
performance of elements - Part 4: Transmission of indoor sound to the outside). 
Since the noise emission data can wary from the Manufacturer data due to the machine 
age, use and maintenance conditions, the preliminary input data shall be considered as a first 
and quite approximate approach: some campaigns based on sound intensity measurements 
will be started in ‘02 fall, to get a direct evaluation of the sound power of the main machines 
in use. 
 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
On the basis of the experience drawn from the analysis of the difficulties met in the real 
case of the construction of a subway in Northern Italy, the following considerations can be 
drawn: 
a. as stated, a careful risk analysis, and the deriving management solutions are a must since the very 
beginning of the construction design, and both normal working conditions and emergency situations 
should be taken into account; 
b. the risk analysis shall consider not only the protection of workers at the workplaces, but also the possible 
problems due to the interference of the town activities on the site, and vice versa; 
c. nevertheless, in the case of important construction operations in urbanized areas, some flexibility is 
necessary with regards to the possible solutions of the safety problems, so that the minimal risk conditions 
can be granted even if some unexpected modifications in the work development or organization become 
necessary (the Safety Coordinator during work execution and the site contractor are involved); 
d. due to the limited areas available, and to the peculiarity of the subway construction operations, both 
rough and extremely specialized activities are necessary, this worsening the difficulty –typical of 
excavations- of careful operations to be carried out with high kW/man ratios; 
e. the aforesaid activities are often carried on by different subcontractors, and some overlapping can occur 
even between contiguous sites, developed by different contractors, so that the task of the Safety 
Coordinator during work execution cannot be considered a really relaxing one, requiring technical, 
organizing and also human capabilities); 
f. in spite of any careful safety analysis and management, 
some unexpected event may nevertheless occur: it is then 
particularly important that the people operating at the 
construction sites prove remarkable common sense and 
quick reflexes. 
 
 
 
young elephant looking for freedom 
in a construction area  (27 05 02) 
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